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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This interlocutory appeal arises from a denial of the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment on qualified 
immunity grounds.1 At issue is whether police officers' 
threat to disclose the suspected sexual orientation of an 
arrestee to his family member violated the young man's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We exercise plenary review over a District Court's order granting 
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The plaintiff, as 
the non-moving party, is entitled to every favorable inference that can be 
drawn from the record. Bartholomew v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 
No. 99-1755, 2000 WL 1101180 (3d Cir. Aug. 7, 2000); Sharrar v. 
Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 817 (3d Cir . 1997). 
 
Some facts are undisputed. Where discr epancies exist, we relate the 
plaintiff 's version. 
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constitutional right to privacy. We will affirm the order of 
the District Court because the law is clearly established 
that matters of personal intimacy are pr otected from 
threats of disclosure by the right to privacy and at least one 
of the officers involved was aware that his conduct was 




On April 17, 1997, 18-year old Marcus W ayman and a 
17-year old male friend were parked in a lot adjacent to a 
beer distributor. The car and its occupants were observed 
by the defendant police officer, F. Scott Wilinsky. Wilinsky 
was concerned about previous burglaries of the beer 
distributor and was suspicious of the fact that the 
headlights on the car were out. Wilinsky called for back-up 
and, shortly thereafter, Officer Thomas Hoban, the second 
defendant, arrived at the scene. 
 
The officers' investigation did not show any sign of a 
break-in at the business, but it was appar ent to the officers 
that the young men had been drinking alcohol. The boys 
were also evasive when asked what they wer e doing in the 
parking lot. When an eventual search uncover ed two 
condoms, Wilinsky questioned whether the boys were in the 
parking lot for a sexual assignation. Wilinsky testified that 
both Wayman and his companion eventually acknowledged 
that they were homosexuals and were in the parking lot to 
engage in consensual sex, but we note that the 17-year old 
denied making such admissions. 
 
The two boys were arrested for underage drinking and 
were taken to the Minersville police station. At the station, 
Wilinsky lectured them that the Bible counseled against 
homosexual activity. Wilinsky then war ned Wayman that if 
Wayman did not inform his grandfather about his 
homosexuality that Wilinsky would take it upon himself to 
disclose this information. After hearing this statement, 
Wayman confided to his friend that he was going to kill 
himself. Upon his release from custody, W ayman committed 
suicide in his home. 
 
Wayman's mother, Madonna Sterling, as executrix of her 
son's estate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 against the 
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Borough of Minersville, Wilinsky and Hoban, as individuals 
and in their capacity as police officers, and the Chief of 
Police of Minersville. The complaint alleged that the officers 
and the borough violated Wayman's Fourth Amendment 
right against illegal arrest, his Fourteenth Amendment 
rights to privacy and equal protection and the laws and the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 
 
Following discovery, the defendants filed a motion for 
summary judgment. The District Court denied summary 
judgment on the right to privacy, state law and municipal 
liability claims, but granted the motion with r espect to the 
Fourth Amendment claim that the arrest of W ayman was 
without probable cause. The court further ruled that the 
officers were not entitled to qualified immunity since their 
conduct violated Wayman's clearly established right to 
privacy as protected by the Constitution. 
 
Officers Hoban and Wilinsky filed notices of appeal 
consistent with our authority to hear interlocutory appeals 
on the issue of qualified immunity. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 
U.S. 511 (1985). It is this issue alone which draws our 




We have previously set forth the analytical framework for 
deciding qualified immunity claims. First, we must 
determine if the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a 
clearly established constitutional right. Assaf v. Fields, 178 
F.3d 170, 174 (3d Cir. 1999). A right is clearly established 
if its outlines are sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer 
would understand that his actions violate the right. 
Kornegay v. Cottingham, 120 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 1997). 
If a violation exists, the immunity question focuses on 
whether the law is established to the extent that"the 
unlawfulness of the action would have been appar ent to a 
reasonable official." Assaf, 178 F .3d at 174. The status of 
the right as clearly established and the reasonableness of 
the official conduct are questions of law. Sharrar, 128 F.3d 
at 808. 
 
We first ask whether Wayman had a pr otected privacy 
right concerning Wilinsky's thr eat to disclose his suspected 
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sexual orientation. If the right exists, we then query 
whether it was clearly established at the time of its alleged 
violation. 
 
In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the 
Supreme Court first acknowledged the individual's 
constitutional right to privacy. In Griswold, the Court 
declared that a state law prohibiting use of contraceptives 
by married couples was unconstitutional because it violated 
the right to privacy as gleaned from the penumbra of rights 
established by the Bill of Rights. Id. at 485-86. The 
Griswold decision validated a dissent written forty years 
earlier by Justice Brandeis in Olmsted v. United States, 277 
U.S. 438, 478 (1928), which described the privacy right as 
"the right to be let alone -- the most compr ehensive of 
rights and the right most valued by civilized men. T o 
protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion of the 
government upon the privacy of an individual .. . must be 
deemed a [constitutional] violation." Id. at 478 (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). 
 
The boundaries of the right to privacy, however , have not 
been clearly delineated.2 In Griswold, the majority placed 
heavy emphasis on the intimate relationship of husband 
and wife in deciding that personal decisions r elating to 
marriage are free from unjustified government interference. 
Later, however, the Court recognized that the right of 
privacy inured to the individual beyond the marital state. In 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Court 
invalidated a Massachusetts law that made it a felony to 
give anyone other than a married person contraceptive 
medicines or devices. The Eisenstadt majority held that the 
right to privacy is not limited to certain r elationships: 
 
        If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives 
       to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on 
       distribution to unmarried persons would be equally 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The privacy right has been extended to activities relating to marriage, 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942); contraception, Eisenstadt, 405 
U.S. 438, 453 (1972); family relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
U.S. 158, 166 (1944); child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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       impermissible. It is true that in Griswold  the right of 
       privacy inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the 
       marital couple is not an independent entity with a 
       mind and heart of its own, but an association of two 
       individuals each with separate intellectual and 
       emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means 
       anything, it is the right of the individual, married or 
       single, to be free from unwarranted gover nmental 
       intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
       person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. 
 
Id. at 453 (citations omitted). 
 
A year later in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the 
Court observed that there is "a right of personal privacy, or 
a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy," protected 
by the Constitution. Id. at 152. This guarantee of personal 
privacy, covers "only personal rights that can be deemed 
`fundamental' or `implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' " 
Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
 
The constitutional right to privacy was further r efined in 
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). In Whalen, the 
constitutionality of a New York statute which required that 
the state be provided with a copy of pr escriptions for 
certain drugs was challenged by physicians and patients. 
While the statute's validity was ultimately upheld, the 
Court held that the constitutional right to privacy respects 
not only an individual's autonomy in intimate matters, but 
also an individual's interest in avoiding divulgence of highly 
personal information. Id. at 599-600. This sentiment was 
reaffirmed in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 
433 U.S. 425 (1977), wherein the Court, quoting Whalen, 
429 U.S. at 599, acknowledged that "[o]ne element of 
privacy has been characterized as the individual interest in 
avoiding disclosure of personal matters." Nixon, 433 U.S. at 
457. 
 
We recognize that the Supreme Court has not definitively 
extended the right to privacy to the confidentiality of one's 
sexual orientation. Indeed, a later case gives us pause. In 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Supreme 
Court overturned a decision of the Court of Appeals of the 
Eleventh Circuit that had invalidated a Geor gia statute that 
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made consensual homosexual sodomy a criminal of fense. 
The majority rejected the claim that the Constitution 
confers a "federal right upon homosexuals to engage in 
sodomy." Id. at 192. 
 
While Bowers indicates that the Court is r esistant to 
bestowing the protection of the Constitution on some 
sexual behavior, its ruling focused on the practice of 
homosexual sodomy and is not determinative of whether 
the right to privacy protects an individual fr om being forced 
to disclose his sexual orientation. In other wor ds, the 
decision did not purport to punish homosexual status. 
Such a determination would in fact be contrary to the 
Court's holding in Robinson v. California , 370 U.S. 660 
(1962), that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid 
punishment of status as opposed to conduct. Id.  at 667. We 
do not read Bowers as placing a limit on privacy protection 
for the intensely personal decision of sexual pr eference.3 
 
Our jurisprudence takes an encompassing view of 
information entitled to a protected right to privacy. "The 
right not to have intimate facts about one's life disclosed 
without one's consent . . . is a venerable one whose 
constitutional significance we have recognized." Bartnicki v. 
Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 122 (3d Cir . 1999), cert. granted, 120 
S. Ct. 2716 (2000). 
 
First, in United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 
F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980), we held that private medical 
information is "well within the ambit of materials entitled to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990), the Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined the law of privacy in the 
context of a police background questionnair e which asked if the 
applicant ever had same sex relations. The court of appeals relied on the 
Supreme Court's refusal to find in Bowers that the privacy right 
protected homosexual sodomy in deciding that the question was not 
repugnant to that right. 
 
We part company with our sister court's ruling because the court, 
without discussion, applied Bowers as contr olling on the issue of forced 
disclosure of sexual orientation despite the fact that Bowers focused on 
whether a state could constitutionally prohibit certain consensual 
homosexual conduct. Neither Bowers nor Walls inform the issue before 
us. 
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privacy protection," in part because it concerns intimate 
facts of a personal nature. Id. at 577. We cautioned, 
however, that the right is not absolute. Public health or like 
public concerns may justify access to infor mation an 
individual may desire to remain confidential. In examining 
right to privacy claims, we, therefore, balance a possible 
and responsible government interest in disclosure against 
the individual's privacy interests. Id. 
 
In Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia, 812 
F.2d 105, 110 (3d Cir. 1987), we held that questions posed 
concerning medical, financial and behavioral information 
relating to whether police officer applicants were capable of 
working in stressful and dangerous positions did not 
unconstitutionally infringe on the applicant's privacy rights, 
but determined that there were inadequate safeguards on 
unnecessary disclosure of the information obtained. We 
observed that "[i]t would be incompatible with the concept 
of privacy to permit protected infor mation . . . to be publicly 
disclosed." Id. at 118. In perfor ming the necessary 
balancing inquiry, we looked to the individual's privacy 
expectation and concluded that "[t]he mor e intimate the 
information, the more justified the expectation that it will 
not be subject to public scrutiny." Id. at 112-13. 
 
Next, in Doe v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation 
Authority, 72 F.3d 1133 (3d Cir. 1995), a public employee 
brought a section 1983 action for violations of his right to 
privacy when the employer discovered, thr ough records of 
drug purchases made through the employee health 
program, that the employee had AIDS. After weighing 
certain factors to determine whether the disclosure 
constituted an actionable invasion of privacy, we 
determined that the public employer's need to access the 
prescription records for purposes of monitoring the health 
plan outweighed the employee's interest in keeping his drug 
purchases confidential. Id. at 1143. We arrived at this 
conclusion, however, only after identifying the government's 
interest in the information as "genuine, legitimate and 
compelling." Id. at 1141. 
 
Most recently, in Gruenke v. Seip, No. 98-2041, 2000 WL 
1183064 (3d Cir. August 21, 2000), a high school swim 
team coach, suspecting that a teenage team member was 
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pregnant, required the young woman to take a pregnancy 
test. The young woman and her mother filed a section 1983 
action claiming inter alia that the pr egnancy test 
unconstitutionally interfered with the daughter's right to 
privacy regarding personal matters. W e decided that the 
daughter's claim "fell squarely within the contours of the 
recognized right to be free from disclosure of personal 
matters as outlined in Whalen v. Roe" and held that the 
fact that the coach compelled the student to take the test, 
coupled with an alleged failure to take appr opriate steps to 
keep the information confidential infringed the girl's right to 
privacy. Id. at *9. Significant to today's matter, we 
determined that this type of conduct was not objectively 
reasonable under the law and could not entitle the coach to 
immunity from suit. Id. 
 
We thus carefully guard one's right to privacy against 
unwarranted government intrusion. It is difficult to imagine 
a more private matter than one's sexuality and a less likely 
probability that the government would have a legitimate 
interest in disclosure of sexual identity. 4 
 
We can, therefore, readily conclude that Wayman's sexual 
orientation was an intimate aspect of his personality 
entitled to privacy protection under Whalen . The Supreme 
Court, despite the Bowers decision, and our court have 
clearly spoken that matters of personal intimacy ar e 
safeguarded against unwarranted disclosur e. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. While we have not previously confr onted whether forced disclosure of 
one's sexual orientation would be protected by the right to privacy, we 
agree with other courts concluding that such information is intrinsically 
private. See Powell v. Scrivner, 175 F .3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1999) ("the 
excruciatingly private and intimate nature of transsexualism, for persons 
who wish to preserve privacy in the matter , is really beyond debate"); 
Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 685 (6th Cir. 1998) (publicly revealing 
information regarding sexuality and choices about sex exposes an aspect 
of our lives that we regard as personal and private); Eastwood v. Dept. 
of Corrections, 846 F.2d 627, 631 (10th Cir. 1998) (right to privacy "is 
implicated when an individual is forced to disclose information regarding 
personal sexual matters"); Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 
468 (9th Cir. 1980) (the interest raised in the privacy of sexual 
activities 
is within the zone of privacy protected by the Constitution). 
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The zone of privacy, while clearly established in matters 
of personal intimacy, is not absolute. If ther e is a 
government interest in disclosing or uncovering one's 
sexuality that is "genuine, legitimate and compelling," Doe 
v. SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1141, then this legitimate interest can 
override the protections of the right to privacy. In this 
instance, however, no such government interest has been 
identified. Indeed, Wilinsky conceded he would have no 
reason to disclose this type of sensitive infor mation. 
 
Before we can definitely conclude that a constitutional 
tort has occurred, however, we must further ask whether 
Wilinsky's threat of disclosur e, rather than actual 
disclosure, constituted a violation of W ayman's right to 
privacy. 
 
Cases discussing actionability of threats to violate 
constitutional rights appear to follow one of two directions. 
Simply put, threats accompanied by a "chilling effect" that 
deny or hinder the exercise of a constitutional right have 
been deemed cognizable, see e.g., Citizens Action Fund v. 
City of Morgan, 154 F.3d 211, 216 (5th Cir. 1998), opinion 
withdrawn on denial of rehearing, 172 F .3d 923 (5th Cir. 
1999) ("threats of unconstitutionally enfor cing laws against 
individuals can lead to chilling effect upon speech, silencing 
voices and opinions which First Amendment was meant to 
protect"); Lamar v. Steele, 693 F .2d 559, 562 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(contested state action aimed at precluding plaintiff 's 
participation in future litigation implicated First 
Amendment's protections of free speech and right to 
petition), while threats arising in constitutional contexts 
without a deterrent effect could not substantiate a section 
1983 claim. See e.g. Schlessinger v. Salimes, 100 F.3d 519 
(7th Cir. 1996) (threat to arrest not cognizable); Balliet v. 
Whitmere, 626 F. Supp. 219 (M.D. Pa. 1986), aff 'd, 800 
F.2d 1130 (3d Cir. 1986) (threat to remove child from home 
not a constitutional violation). 
 
A threat to disclose implicating privacy rights does not, to 
us, fit into either category. The threat of disclosure does not 
have a chilling effect since the right to privacy is pervasive, 
i.e., no particular action is deterred. Instead, the essence of 
the right to privacy is in "avoiding disclosur e of personal 
matters," Whalen, id. at 599. The threat to breach some 
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confidential aspect of one's life then is tantamount to a 
violation of the privacy right because the security of one's 
privacy has been compromised by the thr eat of disclosure. 
Thus, Wilinsky's threat to disclose W ayman's suspected 
homosexuality suffices as a violation of W ayman's 




We next address whether Officers W ilinsky and Hoban 
could reasonably believe that their conduct in regard to 
Wayman was lawful in light of the established law and the 
information in their possession. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 
224, 227 (1991). 
 
A. Officer Hoban 
 
Officer Hoban claims that he is entitled to qualified 
immunity because no evidence connected him to the 
questioning of Wayman, or any other action that would 
constitute a violation of Wayman's constitutional rights. 
 
An interlocutory appeal, however, does not lie from a 
denial of qualified immunity when the claim is one of 
factual insufficiency. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 
(1996). Stated another way -- an "I didn't do it" argument 
is not recognizable in this context. Reyes v. Sazan, 168 
F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 
Thus, we are without jurisdiction to discuss Hoban's 
qualified immunity argument.5 
 
B. Officer Wilinsky 
 
Similarly, we do not discuss whether Wilinsky made the 
alleged statement concerning the threatened disclosure of 
Wayman's homosexuality to Wayman's grandfather.6 To 
reiterate, our jurisdiction to hear interlocutory qualified 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Additionally, Hoban did not argue to the District Court that he is 
factually remote from the allegations of the complaint. 
 
6. The fact that Wilinsky so advised W ayman of his intent to disclose was 
conceded at oral argument. 
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immunity appeals exists only to the extent that the denial 
turns on an issue of law. Johnson v. Jones , 515 U.S. 304, 
313 (1995). Where, however, the denial turns on the 
sufficiency of the evidence, an appeal will not lie until the 
District Court enters final judgment in the case. In re 
Montgomery County, 215 F.3d 367 (3d Cir . 2000). Thus, 
Wilinsky could not appeal the denial of qualified immunity 
on the grounds he did not make the statement. Otherwise, 
his appeal would suffer the same fate as Hoban's "I didn't 
do it" appeal. 
 
We turn then to whether Wilinsky should have known 
that his conduct, as described by the plaintif f, violated 
clearly established law. As previously discussed, by 
Wilinsky's own acknowledgment, disclosur e of Wayman's 
suspected homosexuality would be a matter of private 
concern. Wilinsky stated that because W ayman was 18, 
there was no reason for him to inter fere with Wayman's 
family's awareness of his sexual orientation. In addition, 
Wilinsky testified that he did not include suspicion of 
homosexual activity in his police report because of the 
confidential nature of the information. Obviously, then, 
Wilinsky was aware that one's sexual orientation is 
intrinsically personal and no compelling reason to disclose 
such information was warranted. Because the confidential 
and private nature of the information was obvious, and 
because the right to privacy is well-settled, the concomitant 
constitutional violation was apparent notwithstanding the 
fact that the very action in question had not pr eviously 
been held to be unlawful. See Gruenke v. Seip , 225 F.3d 
290, 299 (3d Cir. 2000), quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 
U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987). Accordingly, W ilinsky could not 
reasonably have believed that his questioned conduct was 




7. Wilinsky offers that, as a small town police officer, his role has 
parental overtones, thus, reducing the citizen's expectation of privacy 
when they encounter him in an official capacity. W e mention this only to 
note our disagreement with the concept that the breadth of one's 
constitutional rights can somehow be diminished by demographics. 
 




For the reasons stated above, we will affir m the order of 
the District Court denying summary judgment on the 
grounds of qualified immunity. 
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STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I respectfully dissent. 
 
In order for law to be "clearly established" for purposes of 
qualified immunity, there must be pre-existing authority 
which rules out the possibility that a reasonable official in 
the defendant's position could have believed his conduct to 
be lawful. Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204 F .3d 425, 436 (3d Cir. 
2000). "This is not to say that an official action is protected 
by qualified immunity unless the very action in question 
has been previously held unlawful, but it is to say that in 
light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be 
apparent." See Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 299 (3rd Cir. 
2000), quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 
(1987). Here, prior to the events giving rise to this case, 
there was no Supreme Court case law addr essing either the 
issue of whether there is a constitutionally pr otected right 
of privacy in one's sexual orientation, or the issue of 
whether a mere threat to disclose constitutionally protected 
private information can constitute a constitutional tort. Of 
the decisions of the inferior courts, only one addr essed the 
former issue, Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188 (4th 
Cir. 1990), and it held that there is no constitutionally 
protected privacy interest in one's sexual orientation. With 
respect to the second issue, there was no case holding that 
an unexecuted threat to disclose private infor mation can 
constitute a violation of the right to privacy, and the case 
law dealing with threats to violate other constitutional 
rights provided no affirmative support for the proposition 
that threats to violate a right of privacy wer e actionable. 
Thus, it cannot be said that the unlawfulness of Officer 
Wilinsky's conduct was apparent at the time it occurred. It 
follows that he is entitled to qualified immunity. 
 
Before elaborating on our differences, I note my 
agreement with much that the Court has today said. 
Though we have not addressed the issue befor e, I agree 
that, based on the precedents of this Court, W ayman did 
possess a privacy interest in his sexual orientation. Our 
previous decisions in Westinghouse  and FOP have 
understood the right to privacy to encompass all"intimate 
facts of a personal nature." See United States v. 
Westinghouse, 638 F.3d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980); Fraternal 
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Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 112-13 
(3d Cir. 1987). I think it fair to say that our society regards 
a person's sexual orientation as intimate infor mation of a 
personal nature and, accordingly, r ecognizes a reasonable 
and legitimate expectation of privacy in that infor mation.1 
 
The alleged action of Wilinsky primarily at issue here is 
his threat to disclose private information.2 It is clear that 
while Officer Wilinsky threatened to disclose Wayman's 
suspected sexual orientation, he did not in fact do so. Even 
so, I am in agreement with the Court that W ilinsky's threat 
to disclose Wayman's suspected sexual orientation violated 
the Constitution. I reach this conclusion, however, by a 
different route than the Court. I believe that a threat to 
disclose private information violates the constitutional right 
to privacy only where, as here, an officer with no legitimate 
interest in effecting disclosure makes a threat, the intended 
and foreseeable effect of which is involuntary self- 
disclosure. 
 
Essentially a blackmail mechanism, Wilinsky's"tell now 
or I'll tell later" threat had the for eseeable effect of forcing 
disclosure by Wayman without any further action on the 
part of Wilinsky. It would make little sense to condone an 
officer's acts effecting disclosure simply because the victim 
is made the instrument of the disclosure. It makes more 
sense to examine the culpability of the conduct and ask 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. While I consider it a closer issue than my colleagues do, I also 
ultimately reject the analysis proffered in Walls v. City of Petersburg, 
895 
F.2d 188, 193 (1990). Unlike the Walls court, I do not read the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Bowers as intended to af fect cases arising under the 
disclosure prong of Whalen. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
 
2. The argument that the questioning  violated Wayman's constitutional 
right to privacy is unpersuasive. As the Court's opinion notes, the two 
young men were found hiding in a parked jeep on the premises of a 
closed beer distributor in a high-crime area. They gave contradictory and 
evasive explanations for their presence. Officer Wilinsky apparently 
believed some criminal activity may have been afoot, and did not act 
unreasonably by questioning the young men tofind out why they were 
there. As the Court observes, if there is a legitimate governmental 
interest in uncovering or disclosing a person's sexual orientation, that 
interest overrides the protections of the right to privacy. 
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whether an officer completed steps reasonably designed to 
effect disclosure with the intent that disclosure would 
result. In short, I believe Wilinsky's threat itself was a 
violation of Wayman's right to privacy because Wilinsky, 
acting as a state officer, knowingly engaged in conduct 
reasonably calculated to effect the involuntary disclosure of 
Wayman's sexual orientation. 
 
Thus, I agree with the Court's decision that a 
constitutional violation occurred. I part ways with my 
colleagues, however, on whether the unconstitutionality of 
Wilinsky's conduct was clearly established by the pre- 
existing case law. 
 
First, a person's right to privacy in his or her sexual 
orientation simply was not clearly established in April of 
1997. Only one opinion directly addressing the issue 
existed at the time of Wilinsky's conduct, and that opinion 
held that no right to privacy exists in a person's sexual 
orientation.3  See Walls, 895 F.2d at 193 (rejecting, on the 
authority of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the 
proposition that a city employee's right to privacy was 
violated by her being requiring to state whether she had 
"ever had sexual relations with a person of the same sex"). 
With the relevant case law in this state, I am unable to 
conclude that no reasonable officer in W ilinsky's position 




3. I find unpersuasive the majority's citation of several other cases in 
footnote four. Three of these cases wer e decided after the events at 
issue 
here took place. As the majority correctly notes, the applicable test 
looks 
to the time of the right's alleged violation. See Conn v. Gabbert, 526 
U.S. 
286, 290 (1999). I cannot conclude that our law was clearly established 
in 1997 based upon opinions issued after that date. Thorne, the sole 
remaining case, involved an inquiry into the explicit factual details of a 
job applicant's sexual history and miscarriage, including the identities 
of 
her past sexual partners. See Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 
459, 462 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1980). While Thorne was decided in 1983, it 
cannot be viewed as having clearly established a privacy right in a 
person's sexual orientation as of 1997. The Fourth Circuit's decision in 
Walls addressed the issue squar ely in 1990 and reached the opposite 
conclusion based primarily on Bowers, a Supr eme Court precedent 
decided three years after Thorne. Thus, the law in this area was, at best, 
unclear. 
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Second, I must differ with the Court when itfinds that 
the right to privacy is generally infringed by thr eats to 
violate that right and then concludes that this rule is 
clearly established. Where, as with the rights of free 
exercise and free access to the courts, the exercise of a 
constitutional right requires a volitional act on the part of 
the holder of the right, courts have taken the r ealistic view 
that threats alone may impermissibly chill the exercise of 
the right and, accordingly, may give rise to liability. Outside 
the narrow confines of rights specifically protecting free 
exercise or access, however, courts have held that threats 
to violate constitutional rights are not generally actionable 
as constitutional violations. See, e.g. Pittsley v. Warish, 927 
F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 1991); Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d 
351, 353 (6th Cir. 1989); King v. Olmstead County, 117 
F.3d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir. 1997); Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 
923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987); Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 
827 (10th Cir. 1979). The Court cites no case in which a 
threat to violate a right to privacy has been held to violate 
the Constitution, and I know of none. While, as I have 
indicated, I would be willing to hold that this particular 
threat did violate Wayman's constitutional right to privacy 
because it had the foreseeable consequence of effecting 
disclosure without further action on the part of Wilinsky, I 
must acknowledge that I have found no precedent 
anticipating the formation of such a rule. The state of the 
case law dealing with threats to violate the Constitution is 
thus an independent reason for sustaining W ilinsky's 
qualified immunity. 
 
I would remand to the District Court with instructions to 
dismiss the count of Sterling's claim alleging a violation of 
the right to privacy. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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